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Being a historian of the region, I naturally welcomed the publishing of The Routled-
ge Handbook of Balkan and Southeast European History in October 2020 (for more 
information on this edited volume see https://www.routledge.com/The-Routled-
ge-Handbook-of-Balkan-and-Southeast-European-History/Lampe-Brunnbauer/p/
book/9781138613089). Whereas the vast majority of the contributions contained in 
the volume fall outside my area of expertise, I feel there are a number of points in He-
ather Williams’ piece „Partisans And Chetniks in occupied Yugoslavia“ that need to be 
addressed in some detail. Let’s start:
• p. 392: „The Independent State of Croatia (the NDH) had already adhered 
to the Tripartite Pact on April 10 and withdrawn from hostilities.“
The NDH was proclaimed on 10 April 1941; it would officially join the Tri-
partite Pact only on 15 June 1941.
(Bogdan Krizman, „Pavelić između Hitlera i Musolinija“, Zagreb, Globus, 
1980, p. 76).
• p. 393: „In Serbia, the German invasion of the USSR on June 11, combined 
with feelings of outrage at the suffering of fellow Orthodox Christians 
arriving as refugees from the NDH, produced a spontaneous rising, 
encouraged by the withdrawal of many German frontline divisions to the 
east.“
The invasion of the USSR began on 22 June 1941.
Unlike the sudden, violent, and largely spontaneous uprisings in Montenegro 
and the NDH, the uprising in Serbia was a much more gradual, snowball-
effect affair, set in motion by the Communists.
(Branko Petranović, „Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu“, Belgrade, VINC, 1992, 
pp. 177-78).
• p. 393: „In late August, the Germans appointed a Serbian puppet 
government headed by General Milan Nedić, former Minister of War, who 
was allowed to establish a Serbian State Guard to ensure internal order.“
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The first Serbian collaborationist allowed to form a gendarmerie in order to 
ensure internal order was Milan Aćimović already in May 1941; the gendar-
merie would be renamed Serbian State Guard only in March 1942.
(Milan Borković, „Kontrarevolucija u Srbiji“, Belgrade, Sloboda, 1979, Vol. I, 
pp. 42, 287).
• p. 393: „Arrested for distributing illegal literature in 1928 and sentenced 
to five years, Tito used his time in prison to extend his political reading and 
later referred to it as his ‘university’.“
In fact, Tito was arrested for organizing protests about the murder of the Cro-
at politician Stjepan Radić, as well as a general strike.
(Geoffrey Swain, Tito: A Biography, New York, I.B. Tauris, 2011, p. 12).
• p. 394: „When Stalin made it clear that he wanted action against the Axis, 
not social revolution, the Partisans attacked the Germans in early August.“
There were only ca. 30,000 German army personnel stationed in occupied 
Serbia and the NDH in the summer of 1941, which was barely enough to 
secure the major urban centers and industrial objects, let alone the vast, 
rugged countryside. This, combined with the fear that any, even the most 
minute defeat at the hands of the insurgents would constitute a major propa-
ganda blow, made the Wehrmacht command actually forbid the army from 
taking part in anti-guerrilla actions at one point during the early weeks of 
war in Serbia. For their part, poorly armed and organized as they were at the 
moment, the Communists and other Serbian insurgents were still wary of 
tackling the Wehrmacht directly. Even so, the Partisans captured their first 
German soldiers in Serbia already on 12 July, followed by two more a couple 
of weeks later, not to mention the wounding of General Lontschar of the 
704th Infantry Division on the 18th.
(Gaj Trifković, „Parleying with the Devil: Prisoner Exchange in Yugoslavia 
1941-1945“, Lexington, KY, UPK, 2020, pp. 21-22; NARA/T315/2236/99, 
704th ID, War Diary, 18.7.41).
• p. 394: „The Partisans established headquarters in the town of Užice, 
where Tito joined them from Belgrade, designating the area the ‘Užice 
Republic’.“
Tito left Belgrade for Užička Požega on 16-17 September 1941; he would not 
establish his HQ in Užice before mid-October 1941. The name „Užice Repu-
blic“ was actually concocted by the collaborationist press, not the Partisans.
(„Sabrana djela Josipa Broza Tita“, Vol. VII, Belgrade, „Komunist“, 1982, pp. 
276-77; Trifković, „Parleying“, pp. 43-44).
429
Gaj Trifković: Partisans and Chetniks in occupied Yugoslavia by Heather Williams
• p. 394: „He dispersed most of his forces, sending some home and some 
into the ranks of Nedić’s State Guard where they could obtain arms and 
gather information.“
The majority of Mihailović’s „legalized“ men became a part of the so-called 
„Government Chetniks“ rather than the Serbian State Guard. The Go-
vernment Chetniks, together with the Guard and Ljotić’s Serbian Volun-
teers, constituted the triad of the Serbian collaborationist formations until 
early 1943.
(Jozo Tomasevich, „War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation 
and Collaboration“, Stanford, CA: SUP, 2001, pp. 194-95).
• p. 395: „Tito’s goal remained a return to Serbia but in March 1942, he had 
to accept that for the time being he must develop his movement in Bosnia.“
Tito moved his operations to Bosnia already in January 1942 and remained 
there for as long as he could, hoping the circumstances would allow the re-
turn to Serbia. However, the increasing enemy pressure, as well as the sobe-
ring realization that the USSR will not be able to defeat Germany in the 
foreseeable future (caused, it seems, by the Soviet defeat in the 2nd Battle of 
Kharkov in May 1942), made Tito look west, instead of east.
(Trifković, „Parleying“, pp. 89-90).
• pp. 395-96: „Local Chetniks were joined by forces from Serbia to challenge 
the Partisans...“
Apart from a few individuals, the Chetniks from Serbia never intervened in 
Eastern Herzegovina in 1941-42 (they did so on occasion in Eastern Bosnia).
• p. 396: „The so-called Long March, 200 miles along the watershed between 
the Italian and German demarcation line, was also a watershed for the 
Partisan movement and would result in a transformation into a disciplined 
and organized force. Their route took them through areas that had seen 
ethnic strife but the Communist leadership was careful to distinguish 
between Ustaša and ordinary Croats or Muslims.“
„The National Liberation Army (NLA) had a wider appeal than the overtly 
Communist Proletarian Brigades and by the end of 1942 was three times 
larger and growing.“
„The military leaders, many of them Spanish civil war veterans, now 
molded the NLA into a much more useful body than the irregular one that 
had left Serbia in 1941.“
The process of „regularization“ did not happen over night as suggested here, 
but lasted from the beginning until the end of the war. Officially, it began 
with the Conference at Stolice on 26-27 September 1941. The conference 
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established a clear chain of command (Supreme HQ -> regional, or „Main“ 
HQ s -> Detachment -> Battalion -> Company -> Platoon -> Squad), and 
regulated the questions of insignia, salute, and military oath, among other 
things. The second step in the process came in December 1941 with the for-
ming of the first semi-regular unit, the 1st Proletarian Brigade; other briga-
des and smaller mobile units (Proletarian and Assault Battalions) followed 
in the period March-June 1942. By the time these mobile outfits were for-
mally merged into divisions and corps of the People’s Liberation Army, they 
were already fairly militarized, comparatively well-led, and decently armed 
light infantry units. The presence of the Spanish civil war veterans was 
mostly felt in the early days of the war, when the Partisan units consisted 
of untrained youths and Party members. Professional officers (from either 
the old Yugoslav or one of the Axis armies), as well as gifted amateurs who 
advanced through the ranks, played at least as an important role.
(Gaj Trifković, „Od ‘ bandita’ do ‘Jugoslovenske armije’: partizanski rat 1941–
1945. http://www.yuhistorija.com/serbian/drugi_sr_txt01c1.html)
• p. 396: „In this remote area of the NDH, of no strategic value and with no 
Axis troops, the Partisans ousted the Ustaša administration in the town of 
Bihać and established the Republic of Bihać.“
The are of Zelengora form where the Partisans started their Great March, was 
far more remote and desolate than their designated objective. Unlike Zel-
engora, Western and Central Bosnia contained several strategically impor-
tant industrial objects (a chemical plant at Jajce, iron ore mines at Prijedor) 
and were incomparably better-off in terms of agricultural wealth. To say no 
Axis troops were present in the region is a gross understatement. In order to 
counter the expansion of the liberated territory–which ultimately covered 
ca. 25,000 square km – the Germans had to use two of their own divisions 
(out of altogether five they had in Yugoslavia minus Slovenia at the end of 
1942), plus whatever NDH and Chetnik forces were available. For instance, 
the area of Bihać, stormed during the first half of November 1942 by eight 
Partisan brigades, was garrisoned by about 4,300 men, including the entire 
4th Active Ustasha Brigade.
(Mladenko Colić, „Pregled operacija na jugoslovenskom ratištu 1941-1945“, 
Belgrade, VII, 1988, pp. 60-66, 72-78; NARA/T314/554/289, Commander 
of German Troops in Croatia, Situation report 17-26.12.1942).
• p. 396: „The new Croat and Muslim recruits enabled the Partisans to 
infiltrate the NDH administration and military in order to gain useful 
support and intelligence.“
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The Partisans had sympathizers in the NDH administration and military long 
before the capture of Bihać. The topic certainly deserves a book of its own; 
let’s take a look at a couple of examples: in October 1941, the NDH police 
discovered a Domobran officer who collected weapons for the guerrillas in 
Petrovaradin; Partisan intelligence service in Karlovac had 15 officers and 
NCOs, as well as 60 privates from the local garrison working for it already 
in late 1941.
(„Zbornik DiPNOR-a“/I/17/15-18, NDH Gendarmerie Petrovaradin to town 
commandant, October 1941; Milovan Dželebdžić, „Obaveštajna služba u 
NOR-u“, Belgrade, VII, 1987, p. 79). 
• p. 397: „Tito and the Partisan leadership negotiated a ceasefire with the 
Germans while the two sides parleyed. This suited the Germans who had 
met stronger than anticipated opposition from the Partisans[...]The pause 
benefited the Partisans and allowed them to penetrate Chetnik- held 
territory.“
There is simply no material evidence for the claim that the „March Negotia-
tions“ led to the truce that Tito wanted so badly; the German „stop“ on 
the Neretva was caused by deteriorating relations with the Italians and the 
need to rest and reorganize their divisions in preparation for the spring and 
summer campaign.
(Klaus Schmider, „Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien“, Hamburg: E. S. Mittler & 
Sohn, 2002, pp. 242-52; for similar conclusions, see Trifković, „Parleying“, pp. 
185-91).
• p. 397: „The Germans also offered Mihailović a ceasefire but he refused.“
The Germans did not make any offers of this kind during the war. It was Miha-
ilović who requested a ceasefire and German material help in order to fight 
the Partisans around Užice in mid-November 1941. During the Battle on 
the Neretva in March 1943, Mihailović’s Chetniks were actually working 
actively together with the Axis forces, being instrumental in the relief of the 
important town of Konjic (German staff officers openly praised „the help of 
the brave Chetniks“).
(Schmider, „Partisanenkrieg“, pp. 76-77, 232-33).
• p. 397: „Once over the river the NLA fought pitched battles with the 
Chetniks, forcing them from their stronghold in eastern Bosnia and 
Herzegovina but unable to progress into Montenegro where the Chetniks 
had regrouped.“
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By mid-May 1943, the Partisans were in possession of large parts of northwe-
stern and central Montenegro, with their advance guards operating as far as 
the outskirts of the capital, Podgorica.
(Schmider, „Partisanenkrieg“, pp. 272, 274).
• p. 398: „Immediately after the Italian armistice, Mihailović sent out a 
general order to his commanders throughout Yugoslavia to attack German 
lines of communication and German troops.“
Mihailović’s offensive was actually limited to Serbia, Eastern Bosnia, and San-
džak; in the remainder of the country (e.g. Montenegro, Eastern Herzego-
vina, Dalmatia, not to mention Western Bosnia), the Chetniks were in the 
process of becoming German auxiliaries.
(Dejan Segić, „Četnici i kapitulacija Italije“, Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 1:2011, pp. 
194-224; Schmider, „Partisanenkrieg“, pp. 322-25).
• p. 398: „American OSS missions with the Partisans had become 
increasingly aware of the fact that the bulk of Partisan activity was directed 
against their domestic enemies rather than German or Ustaša forces. In 
fact, once the Partisans had recognition and support, they concentrated 
only on the civil war.“
It is difficult to refute these claims in a concise manner, even though they have 
no basis in reality. Suffice it to say that more than a half of all Partisans killed 
during the war fell in the seventeen months between January 1944 and May 
1945, precisely during the period when they enjoyed recognition and support 
from east and west alike. Translated into numbers, this reads ca. 105,000 
out of 183,000 (the figures are derived from an internal survey made in the 
early 1960s; the real grand total was probably closer to 240,000). Given the 
rapid decline in combat capabilities of all lesser anti-communist factions, 
this sort of losses could have only been incurred in the fighting against the 
Wehrmacht. Even if one chooses to disregard the vast amount of literature 
and published primary sources on the subject, digitized version of the rele-
vant German documents microfilmed by the US National Archives (most 
notably of the T-311 and T-314 series) had recently become widely availa-
ble; they contain literally thousands of pages that paint an entirely different 
picture than the one presented by individual Allied observers.
(Vladimir Žerjavić, „Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici 
stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu“, Zagreb, Globus, 1992, pp. 
214-15; „Žrtve rata 1941-1945. Rezultati popisa“, Belgrade, SZS, 1966, pp. 
52-53).
433
Gaj Trifković: Partisans and Chetniks in occupied Yugoslavia by Heather Williams
• p. 399: „Tito had extended links to Macedonia and Kosovo and Partisans 
were established in Slovenia but, try as he might, Serbia eluded him: it 
remained largely loyal to Mihailović and King Petar.“ 
Actually, the Partisan presence in Kosovo was far weaker than in Serbia: by the 
spring of 1944, practically the entire region between the Rasina and Bulga-
rian and Macedonian borders, minus the towns and communications in the 
South Morava Valley and its tributaries, was in their hands (and had more 
or less been since 1941). „Loyalty of the people“ is a very shaky concept: the 
majority of the people, as all the warring parties learned sooner or later, goes 
with whoever appears to be the strongest in a given moment. The alleged-
ly deeply-rooted royalism of the Serbian peasant proved to be a hoax: the 
Communist rule, established in late 1944, was never challenged in a serious 
and organized manner like in some other provinces (e.g. Kosovo, Western 
Herzegovina). Even today, no one is seriously thinking of re-introducing 
monarchy to Serbia.
(Glišić, Venceslav and Gojko Miljanić, „Rukovođenje Narodnooslobodilačkom 
borbom u Srbiji 1941-1945.“, Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1994, 
pp. 213-14, 225; Savo Drljević, „Kontrarevolucija na Kosovu i Metohiji – za-
vođenje Vojne uprave februara 1945“, in „Završne operacije za oslobođenje Ju-
goslavije: učesnici govore“, Belgrade: VINC, 1986, pp. 589-603; Ivica Lučić, 
„Hrvatska protukomunistička gerila u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1945. do 1951.“, 
Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 3: 2010, pp. 631-70).
• p. 399: „Tito would later claim that he had invited the Soviet forces to enter 
Yugoslavia. On its way to confront the main German forces in Hungary, 
the Red Army needed to move through Serbia and the Vojvodina. In doing 
so, they allowed the NLA to enter and begin establishing its authority. The 
Red Army obligingly made a swift detour into Serbia to help the NLA. 
After a week of heavy fighting, Belgrade was liberated on October 20 and 
the Red Army swept on to Hungary.“
On 5 September 1944, the Soviet Forces were expressly forbidden from advan-
cing into Yugoslavia. A fortnight later, the 3rd Ukrainian Front was order to 
prepare the 57th Army for the westward advance. This happened only days 
before Tito arrived to Moscow, and was certainly done on Yugoslav initiati-
ve. In fact, the Red Army could have easily continued its drive into Hungary 
without ever crossing the Danube. The Soviet direct involvement south and 
west of the river lasted longer than one week: it started on 27 September in 
Eastern Serbia and ended almost three months later in Syrmia, where one 
Soviet corps took part in the breaching of the German defenses east of Vu-
kovar (the same corps had been deployed around Kraljevo in October-No-
vember). Furthermore, by the time the Soviets entered Serbia, the Partisans 
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had long „entered“ the country, having an equivalent of 16 divisions in the 
central, eastern, and southern parts of the country.
(„Русский архив: Великая Отечественная. Т. 14 (3-2). Красная Армия в 
странах Центральной, Северной Европы и на Балканах, 1944-1945: 
Док. и материалы.“, Мoscow.: Терра, 2000, p. 214, Stavka to 3rd UF, 
20.9.44; see also the following articles by Gaj Trifković in Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies and Militaergeschichtliche Zeitschrift: „‘Damned Good Ama-
teurs’: Yugoslav Partisans in the Belgrade Operation 1944“, JSMS, 29-2:2016, 
pp. 253-56; „’The German Anabasis’: The Breakthrough of Army Group E 
from Eastern Yugoslavia 1944“, JSMS, 30-4:2017, pp. 610-13; „Carnage in 
the Land of Three Rivers: The Syrmian Front 1944–1945“, MGZ, 75-1:2016, 
pp. 101-02).
• p. 399: „On August 31, he ordered a general uprising, despite having been 
dismissed as Minister of War by King Petar. The mobilization was not a 
success: the Partisans used the cover of Ratweek to enter Serbia, and the 
Germans launched a large-scale attack on Mihailović’s forces. The arrival 
of the Red Army in northeastern Serbia in October, accompanied by its 
new Bulgarian allies, helped to overwhelm Mihailović’s forces and his 
organization collapsed.“
The „Battle for Serbia“ started long before August, 1944 and cannot be depic-
ted without mentioning the German-Chetnik relations. Long story short, 
after his anti-Axis offensive from September-October 1943 (which ultima-
tely failed), Mihailović found himself without allies and facing an impen-
ding Partisan „invasion“ of his heartland. With pre-war stocks depleted and 
no prospect of help from either Italians or the British, Mihailović turned 
to the only party willing to hear him out and being capable of providing 
ammunition: the Germans. The latter, for their part, needed the royalists, 
since their own military presence had dwindled to an equivalent of two-
three heterogeneous regiments (other Axis formations, although numerous, 
were of limited use for active operations). In November-December 1943, 
the two sides signed a series of co-operation treaties not unlike those agreed 
between the Chetniks and NDH authorities in 1942. The alliance would 
continue even after these agreements expired in the early 1944, as witnessed 
by the presence of large (up to 10,000+ men) Chetnik contingents in all 
major German battles against the Partisans, most notably against „Morača’s 
Group“ in March-May, and in the southern parts of the country in July-Au-
gust (incidentally, Operation „Ratweek“ had nothing to do with the arrival 
of the Partisan forces in Serbia). Mihailović’s mobilization of 31 August–1 
September was caused primarily by the arrival of the 1st Proletarian Corps 
to Western Serbia and its impending attack on the general’s seat at Ravna 
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Gora, rather than an uprising against the Germans. During this entire pe-
riod, the Germans never launched „a large-scale attack on Mihailović’s for-
ces“: the did launch several smaller punitive expeditions against some unruly 
Chetnik groups who were raiding trains and causing other incidents. Not 
even after the Chetniks in Central Serbia attempted to ingratiate themselves 
with the Red Army by turning against the Germans at Čačak and Kruše-
vac in mid-October were the Germans ready to break with the royalists: the 
collaboration, based on the same premises, would continue practically until 
the final weeks of the war (e.g. the German-sponsored Chetnik offensive on 
Tuzla in December 1944, the involvement in the Axis operations in Northe-
ast and north-central Bosnia, January-April 1945).
(See the following articles by Gaj Trifković: „The Key to the Balkans: The Battle 
for Serbia 1944“, JSMS, 28-3:2015, pp. 524-55; „Damned Good Amateurs“, 
pp. 277-78; „‘The German Anabasis’: The Breakthrough of Army Group E 
from Eastern Yugoslavia 1944“, JSMS, 30-4:2017, pp. 622-23; „The Yugoslav 
Partisans’ Lost Victories: Operations in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
1944-1945“, Journal of Military History, 82-1:2018, pp. 113-15).
